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Abstract: This paper presents a safety concept for the on-board software system of the 
UPMSat-2 experimental satellite. Subsystems with different criticality levels are assigned to 
different partitions in a partitioned software architecture. The architecture is based on XtratuM, 
an open-source virtualization kernel, and ORK+, an open-source real-time kernel for high-
integrity systems. The safety requirements of the system are analysed, and a safety concept is 
developed based on the partitioned software architecture. The properties of the implementation 
resulting from the approach are discussed, and guidelines for future developments are proposed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern embedded systems typically integrate a multitude 
of functionalities with potentially different criticality lev-
els. In some domains, systems with high criticality com-
ponents have to be certified or qualified according to some 
domain-specific standard, e.g. IEC 61508 for electronic 
systems, DO-178B/C for avionics, IEC 880 for nuclear 
power plants, EN 50128 for European railway systems, or 
the ECSS series for European space systems. 
As embedded systems are becoming more and more com-
plex, the integration of mixed-criticality subsystems can 
lead to a significant and potentially unacceptable increase 
of certification efforts. One approach to limit such ef-
fort is to incorporate mechanisms that establish multi-
ple partitions with strict temporal and spatial separation 
(TSP) between them. Under this approach, subsystems 
with different levels of criticality can be placed in different 
partitions and can be verified and validated in isolation. 
This paper presents a safety concept for a space on-board 
software system based on results from the MultiPARTES 1 
and HI-PARTES 2 projects. The techniques used are illus-
trated by study of an experimental satellite system. 
The software runs on a multicore hardware platform, on 
top of which several software partitions are defined in order 
to execute subsystems with different levels of criticality. 
The paper is organised as follows. The characteristics of 
the satellite system and the general structure of the on-
board software are described in section 2. Section 3 reviews 
the state-of-the art in mixed-criticality systems for space 
applications. The computing platform for the case study 
is described in section 4. Section 5 summarises the safety-
related requirements of the satellite software. The safety 
concept for the qualification of the software is defined in 
section 6. Finally, section 7 contains some conclusions and 
hints for future work. 
2. THE UPMSAT-2 SATELLITE 
UPMSat2 is a university project aimed at building an 
experimental micro-satellite that can be used as a platform 
for experimenting with space technologies and as a support 
for teaching. The project is being carried out by a multidis-
ciplinary team including several research groups at UPM 
with collaboration of a number of industrial companies. 
The satellite is expected to be launched in the last quarter 
of 2016 (Alonso et al., 2103). 
The satellite has a single on-board computer (OBC) that 
is in charge of all platform management, communications, 
and control tasks in the satellite. The computer is com-
plemented with a number of analog, digital, and serial 
interfaces connected to the satellite sensors, actuators, and 
the radio equipment providing communication links with 
ground support stations. The payload of the satellite con-
sists of a number of experiments that have been proposed 
by industrial companies and research groups in order to 
test new hardware devices or new algorithms to be used 
in space systems. 
The on-board software system is composed of a number 
of subsystems, each of them providing a different set 
of functions. Figure 1 displays the current architectural 
design. Its main components are: 
• Manager. This subsystem drives the on-board soft-
ware operation, controls the operation mode of 
the satellite, and performs the functions commonly 
grouped as on-board data handling (OBDH) (Fortes-
cue et al., 2011). 
• Platform. This module is in charge of acquiring plat-
form (housekeeping) data from voltage and tempera-
ture sensors, and checking their validity. 
E j Watlorm 
1 i k i 
Fig. 1. Architectural design of the UPMSat2 software. 
• Attitude determination and control subsystem (ADC'S). 
This subsystem is in charge of controlling the att i-
tude, i.e. the orientation of the satellite with respect 
to the Ear th . 
• Hardware access. This module encapsulates access to 
the hardware devices. 
• Experiments. This subsystem controls the execution 
of the experiments, the collection of da ta resulting 
from them, and the expedition of telemetry packets 
with the results to be analysed on ground. 
• Telecommand and telemetry (TC/TM). This module 
is in charge of communication with the ground sta-
tions. 
• Communications hardware (HWComm). This module 
encapsulates access to the radio hardware. 
• Logbook. This module provides non-volatile storage to 
the other modules. 
The software is written in a safe subset of Ada 2005 
restricted as per the Ravenscar profile (ARM05). The 
GNATforLEON compilation chain (Ruiz, 2005) is being 
used, together with additional tools supporting testing 
and some kinds of static analysis in order to facilitate 
validation. The application software runs on top of the 
GNAT run-time library (GNARL) and the O R K + real-
time kernel, which is developed and maintained by the 
UPM team (de la Puente et al., 2000). 
The original design has been modified to use a mixed-
criticality parti t ioned architecture (Salazar et al., 2014), 
for validating the developed technology and experimenting 
with this type of systems. This approach provides a bet ter 
use of resources by separating the platform software com-
ponents from the payload applications, and thus enabling 
them to be validated independently. 
3. MIXED CRITICALITY SYSTEMS 
3.1 Definition 
In many domains, including aerospace systems, there is a 
t rend to integrate multiple functions with different critical-
ity levels on a shared embedded computing platform (Bau-
mann et al., 2011). This kind of systems are called mixed-
criticality systems. 
Although mixed-criticality systems can be implemented 
in different ways (Burns and Davis, 2013), time and space 
partit ioning (TSP) is the most promising approach from 
an industrial point of view (Crespo et al., 2014). Parti-
tions provide functional separation and fault containment 
among applications or subsystems, in order to prevent any 
application from causing a failure in another application. 
The basic idea behind this approach is visualization, a 
technique tha t provides a virtual machine to each par-
tition, on which applications can run isolated from each 
other. Virtualization is implemented by a software layer 
known clS CL hypervisor or virtualization kernel. In real 
t ime embedded applications, predictability and efficiency 
are important requirements. The virtualization techniques 
used to achieve temporal and spatial isolation jointly with 
real-time constraints require strict design methods and 
efficient solutions to guarantee correct system behaviour. 
Therefore, hypervisors for real-time mixed-criticality sys-
tems must provide timing guarantees in addition to special 
and temporal isolation between parti t ions. 
3.2 Aerospace systems 
The avionics industry has widely adopted the Integrated 
Modular Avionics (IMA) architecture as defined in the 
ARINC 653 s tandard (ARINC). In the space domain, 
ESA has recently launched the IMA for Space project in 
order to define a TSP reference architecture (Windsor and 
Hjortnaes, 2009). Several studies have been carried out 
in this framework (Windsor et al., 2011) with promising 
results. A recent s tudy on porting the EagleEye reference 
mission software to a parti t ioned architecture (Bos et al., 
2013) has demonstrated the feasibility of the approach on 
a real on-board software system. 
3.3 Multicore platforms 
The trend towards using multicore processors in embed-
ded systems adds significant complexity to the design of 
mixed-criticality systems (Fuchsen, 2010). Using multicore 
processors in safety-critical systems raises some issues 
tha t have to be solved (Kinnan, 2009). The most impor-
tant ones are related to spatial and temporal isolation 
at the hardware level. Spatial isolation can commonly be 
achieved using memory management units, but temporal 
isolation is more difficult to at tain. The main reason for it 
is the use of shared hardware resources by different proces-
sor cores, which produces temporal interference between 
software partit ions (Kotaba et al., 2013; Nélis et al., 2013). 
If the interference can be bounded, though, its effect on 
the temporal behaviour of the system can be analysed and 
incorporated to response time analysis techniques. 
4. EXECUTION PLATFORM 
4-1 On-board computer 
The mixed-critical version of the software system has been 
designed to run on a multicore hardware platform, in order 
to enhance the performance of the system and experiment 
with this kind of architecture. 
The modified OBC hardware is based on a dual-core 
LEON3 processor (Gaisler), built on a Xilinx Spartan 
FPGA. A commercial development kit, including an 
FPGA board and an expansion board has been used to 
develop the new platform.3 
4-2 Hypervisor layer 
A hypervisor is a software layer that implements partitions 
using virtualization. Therefore, a hypervisor can be used 
as a separation kernel in a partitioned architecture. The 
main function of the hypervisor is to provide time and 
space separation between partitions, in such a way that 
partitions can be validated independently, provided that 
the hypervisor itself has been qualified to the highest crit-
icality level of all the applications or subsystems running 
in the partitions. 
A multicore version of the XtratruM hypervisor (Masmano 
et al., 2010) has been used to build the partitioned 
version of the UPMSat2 software. The hypervisor runs 
directly on the hardware, creating several abstract runtime 
environments (partitions) where different applications or 
subsystems can be executed. Partitions are executed in 
temporal and spatial isolation from each other. 
XtratuM provides virtualization services to the partitions. 
It is executed in supervisor processor mode, and virtualizes 
the CPU, memory, interrupts, as well as some specific 
peripherals. 
4-3 Operating system layer 
The Open Ravenscar real-time Kernel (ORK+, de la 
Puente et al. 2000) has been used for the operating system 
layer as it provides full conformance for the real-time 
tasking model defined by the Ada Ravenscar profile. The 
profile restricts the tasking model to a static set of peri-
odic and sporadic tasks with a fixed-priority pre-emptive 
scheduling method, communicating through shared data 
objects protected for mutually exclusive access (Burns 
et al., 2003). The restrictions enable static response-time 
analysis to be used to assess the temporal behaviour of 
real-time system on monoprocessor platforms. The kernel 
has been extended to run on XtratuM on a multicore 
LEON3 architecture (Esquinas et al., 2011). 
4-4 Qualification considerations 
The XtratuM multicore version derives from that used 
in the IMA-SP project (Windsor et al., 2011). Further 
verification and validation activities have been carried out 
to ensure compliance with the ECSS standards (ECSS-
E40; ECSS). 
The GNAT Pro runtime environment used in this study 
has evolved from the AdaCore4 GNAT Pro Safety-Critical 
development environment, which is based on the original 
ORK real-time kernel (Ruiz, 2005). The run-time library 
included in it has been qualified to criticality level B of the 
ESA standards. 
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5. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
The rationale for the safety requirements of the system 
comes from the ECSS safety and software engineering 
standards ECSS-Q-ST-40C (ECSS-Q40) and ECSS-E-ST-
40 (ECSS-E40), and from the requirements baseline for 
the UPMSat-2 Software (de la Puente et al., 2014a). A 
selection of such requirements follows. 
(1) Faults detected during the operation of the system 
will be recorded as significant events. Subsequent 
actions may include mode changes or hardware reset 
of the on-board computer. 
(2) Watchdog Timers (WDT) will be used to detect 
possible failures of the computer system and the 
partitions. If the timer expires, a hardware reset of 
the computer or a reset of the required partitions will 
be issued. 
(3) The system must monitor the state of the satellite 
platform by a periodical sampling of representative 
variables of temperature and voltage at select points 
of the satellite (housekeeping data). The measured 
values will be checked for validity, and values outside 
their valid range will be reported. 
(4) The state of the satellite shall be transmitted to 
the ground segment for analysis and event or failure 
handling. 
(5) The ground segment shall send telecommands to the 
satellite to request operations such as changing the 
operation mode, setting the state of hardware devices, 
or updating the validity ranges of sensor values. 
(6) The attitude control output will be validated in order 
to ensure that proper values are sent to the actuators. 
In case of values out of range, the event will be 
reported. 
(7) The system operates in a set of modes. Transitions 
between modes are triggered by events detected in the 
monitoring functions, finalization of operations, timer 
expiration or ground commands. The functions to be 
executed on each mode are adapted to the satellite 
state. The software shall ensure that mode transitions 
are carried out as specified. 
(8) The system shall change to safe mode in case of low 
battery or fault detection, or upon reception of a 
telecommand. System operation during this mode is 
degraded. 
(9) The system shall change to beacon mode if com-
munication with ground is lost. System operation is 
limited to transmitting periodic telemetry messages, 
until communication is recovered. 
(10) Telecommands will carry digital identification codes 
in order to ensure that a valid ground station has 
issued them. 
(11) The system must guarantee time requirements. 
(12) Software failures cannot be propagated in an uncon-
trolled way. 
6. SAFETY CONCEPT 
6.1 General approach 
The UPMSat2 project is aimed at experimenting with 
space technologies and supporting teaching. The project is 
led by IDR (Ignacio da Riva Institute at the Universidad 
Politécnica de Madrid), which has carried out most of the 
activities related to the design and building of the satellite, 
including hazard and risk analysis of the overall system. 
The design of the different subsystems is aimed, among 
other goals, at eliminating or minimizing the most severe 
hazards, until the associated risks are acceptable. 
It is important to note tha t the nature and aims of 
the UPMSat2 project are directed towards building a 
micro-satellite, with limited size and budget. This implies 
tha t the acceptable risks are more severe than for other 
types of satellites. In particular, the size of the satellite 
precludes the extensive use of redundancy for the most 
critical subsystems, even in the case tha t their failure may 
imply the loss of the mission. For instance, neither the 
satellite antenna and communications equipment, nor the 
computer system are replicated. On the other hand, there 
are some replicated components. This is the case for the 
solar panels. Their capacity is larger than needed in the 
nominal state, in order to deal with some kinds of failures. 
In case of failure of one of these elements, it would simply 
cease to provide its functionality. 
The same kind of analysis has been carried out for the 
software system, where its most critical components are 
classified as category B, i.e. "software tha t if not executed, 
or if not correctly executed or whose anomalous behaviour 
can cause or contribute to a system failure resulting in 
critical consequences, usually implying the loss of the mis-
sion" (ECSS-Q40). It can be discussed if this is suitable, 
given the limited fault tolerance approach of the overall 
satellite design, as it implies higher development costs 
and complexity. However, the purpose of UPMSat2 as a 
research and education vehicle fully justifies this decision. 
In the rest of this section, a multicore parti t ioned version of 
the UPMSat2 software is described, and the safety concept 
for two particular aspects of the on-board computing 
system is discussed. 
6.2 Architecture of the partitioned system 
In order to assess the feasibility of qualifying a satellite 
computer system with a multi-core partit ioned mixed-
criticality system, a new version of the system has been 
designed (de la Puente et al., 2014b). As explained in 
section 4, the hardware platform has been changed to a 
dual-core LEON3 processor with shared memory, with an 
instance of the Xt ra tuM hypervisor running on it. 
The application software has been divided into several 
partit ions (see figure 2), according to general software 
engineering practices and to the following principles: 
• Criticality: Modules with different criticality level 
are located in different partit ions. For example, the 
payload experiments are considered less critical than 
the modules managing the satellite platform. 
• Separation of concerns: Modules with related func-
tionality are located in the same parti t ion. 
• Reuse: Some modules have a greater potential for 
reuse, as is the case for the T C / T M module tha t 
can be based on ECSS communication standards. If 
software for this modules is reused, it can be allocated 
to a dedicated partit ion. 
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Fig. 2. Parti t ioned architecture of the space case s tudy 
system. 
• Hardware isolation: Modules tha t directly depend on 
the hardware are located in a specific I / O parti t ion 
handling all the hardware interfaces. 
• Safety: A specific parti t ion can be allocated to so-
called health monitoring functions. 
As shown in figure 2, there is a copy of the operating 
system (ORK+) and the Ada runtime (GNARL) in each 
application partition, on top of which the application 
software is executed. 
The software for the parti t ioned architecture has been 
developed using the Mult iPARTES toolset (Salazar et al., 
2013). The tools generate code skeletons of software com-
ponents, into which functional code is inserted. Scheduling 
plans for the partit ions are generated with the partit ioning 
tool included in the toolset. 
6.3 Safety concept for the satellite software 
The safety concept for the on-board software system is 
based on the following principles (see section 2 for the 
names of the subsystems): 
(1) The manager is the main responsible for driving 
the on-board computer operation. It changes the 
operation mode, in response to faults, events and 
telecommands. 
(2) The T C / T M module forwards telecommands to the 
manager, which either handles them directly, or redi-
rects them to another software module. 
(3) The platform module executes the housekeeping func-
tions. It monitors the s tate of the satellite by sam-
pling housekeeping sensors. Then, it checks if sensors 
are working properly, and if the acquired values are 
within their validity ranges. If these conditions are 
not met, it signals a fault or event to the manager. 
Finally, it enqueues a message with housekeeping da ta 
to be sent to ground. 
(4) The ADCS module checks if the signal to be sent to 
the actuators is within its validity margins. Other-
wise, it notifies this event to the manager. 
(5) The implementation of modules ensures tha t execu-
tion errors are contained and are not propagated in 
an uncontrolled way. They are handled internally, or 
otherwise the part i t ion is stopped. 
(6) Watchdog timers (WDT) are used for detecting fail-
ures in the proper operation of the parti t ions and the 
system. A virtual W D T is managed by the hypervisor 
for each partit ion. If a W D T expires, the associated 
parti t ion is restarted. The time required for this oper-
ation is fast enough to avoid a global system reboot. 
This option is used in case of major failures. 
(7) A hardware W D T is used for detecting possible 
failures of the hypervisor. If this timer expires, the 
computer is reset. 
(8) Telecommands will be either signed or encrypted in 
order to ensure tha t a valid ground station issues 
them. The T C / T M module checks their validity be-
fore forwarding them to the manager. 
Some of these principles will now be described in more 
detail. 
Fault detection, isolation, and recovery 
The original UPMSat2 requirements baseline states tha t 
faults detected may raise mode changes or hardware resets. 
In addition, a hardware watchdog timer (WDT) will be 
used to detect possible failures of the computer system. If 
this timer expires, a hardware reset will be used to restart 
the on-board computer (de la Puente et al., 2014a). 
This requirement is applied to the parti t ioned version of 
the satellite software. The hardware W D T is handled by 
the hypervisor, which is in charge of periodically arming 
the timer. If it reaches zero, the computer is restarted. 
Special consideration has to be taken for each of the par-
titions. Although the same approach based on hardware 
W D T could be used for each partition, in practice it is 
difficult to achieve. Thus, virtual W D T s are used for the 
parti t ions. Each parti t ion is in charge of setting its own 
virtual W D T . If the timer reaches zero, a t rap is raised, 
which is captured by the hypervisor, and a predefined 
handler tha t restarts the parti t ion is executed. The same 
approach is used for dealing with t raps caused by other 
types of software errors. 
Satellite housekeeping: failure detection and handling 
The ECSS-Q-ST-40C s tandard (ECSS-Q40) defines a set 
of special procedures for dealing with hazards tha t are 
not minimized or controlled by fault tolerance or specific 
devices. This is the case for most of the satellite equipment, 
as mentioned above. In this case, it is required to provide 
real-time monitoring, hazard detection and safing systems 
for hazard control. In addition, with respect to hazard de-
tection, signalling and safing, the s tandard indicates tha t 
the system design shall provide the capability for detecting 
failures tha t result in degradation or fault tolerance. Such 
failures have to be notified to the mission operators on 
ground. 
The satellite includes a number of sensors for measur-
ing temperatures, voltages and currents of different sys-
tem components. The software specification requires tha t 
housekeeping da ta are acquired periodically and checked 
for validity. Values out of range are reported to ground. In 
addition, in some cases the on-board software can take au-
tomatic actions for dealing with these values. For instance, 
if the bat tery level is too low, the system is required to 
change to safe mode. As another example, the a t t i tude 
control algorithm can cease temporarily to use the output 
of a malfunctioning sensor, as described above. 
Housekeeping da ta are sent to ground, where they are 
analysed. The system operators have some means for 
dealing with invalid sensor values. For example, they can 
issue telecommands for changing the validity ranges or 
mark a sensor as faulty. 
6.4 Software development 
The software development process follows the ECSS stan-
dards in order to ensure tha t the system requirements are 
met and the software behaves properly. This includes the 
following aspects: 
• Documentation must be writ ten according to ECSS 
standards. 
• Reviews by team members not directly related with 
the development process must be carried out. The 
reviews will include requirements traceability, review 
of the development artefacts, and testing procedures. 
• Propagation of software failures is controlled. Every 
software module includes handlers for avoiding un-
controlled exception propagation. Task termination, 
forbidden by the Ravenscar profile, will raise a t rap 
tha t will be handled by the hypervisor. Finally, the 
isolation of applications as enforced by the hypervisor 
ensures tha t failures in an application will not affect 
others in an uncontrolled way. 
• An object-oriented design approach will be used, 
using UML. The detailed design will map objects onto 
Ada entities. 
• Static analysis will be used to verify robustness with 
respect to errors tha t are difficult to detect at run-
time, such as division by zero, etc. 
• The testing procedures should ensure the fulfilment 
of coverage metrics for criticality category B. 
• Schedulability analysis will be used at different de-
velopment phases to check the fulfilment of time re-
quirements. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
A safety concept for embedded real-time systems running 
on parti t ioned multicore architectures has been presented. 
The safety concept has been applied to the on-board 
software system of an experimental satellite project. The 
software system has components with different criticality 
levels, and the safety requirements for some of the most 
critical components have been analysed independently of 
other components. 
This approach opens new alternatives to the development 
of mixed-criticality on-board systems, and is compatible 
with the software s tandards used in the European space 
industry. Future work includes checking the approach 
with an independent software assurance company in order 
to assess the possibility of qualifying satellite systems 
using parti t ioned multicore architectures in an industrial 
framework. 
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